Belichick's Fourth Down Gamble Pays Off

AP Photo/Steven Senne

Down 24-23 with 2:50 left in the fourth quarter, Bill Belichick made what is sure to be one of the most discussed decisions of Week 6. He opted to go for it on 4th and 6 from the 24, rather than punting and giving the ball back to Drew Brees and the Saints.

When Aaron Dobson dropped Tom Brady's pass, most assumed that the game was over. Then a funny thing happened. The Patriots defense held New Orleans to a field goal, pushing the lead to 27-23 but giving the ball back to Brady with 2:24 left in the game. Brady promptly threw a bad interception deep, a play that appeared to finally signal defeat for New England.

However, a timeout and the two minute warning allowed Brady to get one more chance. We all know what happened from there, as a sensational leaping catch from Kenbrell Thompkins stole victory from the jaws of defeat in the game's final seconds.

Why did Belichick opt to go for it when backed up deep in his own territory? Fox's Troy Aikmen and Thom Brennaman indicated that the move was Belichick conceding that he didn't think his defense could stop Drew Brees and the Saint's offense, who had scored 17 points in the second half to take the lead.

While respect for Brees surely influenced the decision (it's hard to imagine that decision coming against Geno Smith or Christian Ponder), clock management was likely the biggest factor in Belichick's thought process. Failing to convert the fourth down gave New Orleans the ball, already in field goal range. Dobson's drop essentially guaranteed the Saints three points (important because that field goal would push the lead to four, forcing New England to score a touchdown rather than a field goal to win), and a Saints touchdown would have put the game away in that situation.

However, consider the alternative. Punting would have ensured that the lead remained at one, with a field goal still capable of winning the game for the Pats. However, punting also carried the enormous risk of New Orleans killing most (if not all) of the clock, keeping the Patriots from even getting a chance to win. Punting when backed up deep in their own territory also carried a decent chance of New Orleans getting good field position, setting them up to seal the game with merely a few first downs.

By going for it, Belichick ensured one of two scenarios would come to fruition. A New England conversion would allow the team to continue their drive towards a potential game winning field goal (remember, a conversion keeps the score 24-23) while simultaneously keeping the ball from Brees and co. The failure to convert gave New Orleans the ball in scoring position, but also ensured the Patriots would get the ball back with maximum time left on the clock.

If anything, Belichick was betting on his defense being able to hold New Orleans to a field goal if the offense failed to convert. It was a decision that was rewarded when Alfonzo Dennard, victimized on Kenny Stills' lead-taking touchdown, made a clutch breakup on a ball intended for the much bigger Marques Colston, forcing the field goal with 2:29 left in the game. With three time outs and the two-minute warning remaining, Belichick had confidence that he could get his offense the ball back with another chance to win the game.

In many ways, the decision was reminiscent of the infamous intentional safety Belichick took in a 2003 game against Denver. Like that Denver game, Belichick's unconventional gamble gave his team the best chance to win the game, despite also having a high potential to contribute to a loss. It was the start of several prudent clock management decisions that lead to Brady's bunch getting one more chance to steal the win. Brady and Thompkins will deservedly get a lot of credit for their clutch play, but this team's latest improbable victory would not be possible without Belichick proving once again to be one of the boldest and best coaches in the NFL.